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Chinese hip-hop has recently received extensive coverage in the in-ternational media. Dozens of articles, published everywhere from theBBC (2) to l’Express (3) to Time, (4) have attempted to explain the as-
tonishing attempts by the Chinese authorities to censor Chinese rap fol-
lowing the genre’s spectacular rise to prominence throughout the country’s
official media over the last few years. On 19 January 2018, a short dispatch
from the Sina agency reported that Gao Changli (高长力), Director of Pub-
licity for the State Administration of Press, Publication, Radio, Film and Tele-
vision (SAPPRFT), announced that Chinese media were henceforth forbidden
to invite guests such as tattooed artists (wenshen yiren 纹身艺人) or rep-
resentatives of hip-hop culture (xiha wenhua 嘻哈文化), sub-cultures (ya
wenhua 亚文化), or “dispirited culture” (sang wenhua 丧文化). (5) In addition,
guests invited to appear on Chinese media are obliged to follow a strict pro-
tocol and never “disagree with Party rules, use vulgar language, or display a
low ideological level.” (6) So what made the Chinese authorities decide to
ban hip-hop from the national airwaves in the space of just a few weeks?
Before we trace the origins of these events as reported by Chinese and in-
ternational media, it is first necessary to retrace the history of hip-hop in
China, from its birth in the “underground” to its recent commercial break-
through, in order to better understand the contradictory methods of cen-
sorship employed by the Chinese authorities.
The birth of Chinese hip-hop in the musical
“underground”
Like many countercultural movements in China, hip-hop took off during
the 1990s thanks to the influx of dakou (打口) tapes and CDs onto the black
market in major Chinese cities. The term dakou (or “saw-gash”) refers to
unsold discs and cassettes that were sent to China by large Western com-
panies for recycling. To prevent their sale on the black market, companies
broke the edge of the CD in order to make it unplayable—oblivious to the
fact that CDs play outwards from the centre to the edge, meaning that only
the final track was unplayable (De Kloet 2010). In the mid-1990s, these CDs
and cassettes were sold in massive quantities on the black market in large
Chinese cities, breathing new life into an independent music scene that had
been dormant since Tiananmen. The Hong Kongese rap of Lazy Mutha Fucka
(LMF), sung in Cantonese, also had an influence on the first mainland hip-
hop groups by proving that a Chinese language could be rapped. Although
hip-hop was less popular than rock or punk, it nevertheless became an in-
tegral part of the underground musical communities of the 1990s. Later on,
in the early 2000s, the first Chinese hip-hop records were produced by
Scream Records (Haojiao changpian 嚎叫唱片), an independent Beijing
record label born from the ashes of a punk venue known as Scream Club
(Haojiao julebu 嚎叫俱乐部). In 2002, Scream Records published Kung Fu
(Gongfu 功夫), the debut album by CMCB (Chinese MC Brothers, Zhongguo
shuochang xiongdi 中国说唱兄弟), and in 2003 released the album Serve
The People (Wei renmin fuwu 为人民服务) by the international Yin T’sang
(Yincang 隐藏) collective, most notably featuring MC Webber (MC Wangbo
MC王波). Before Chinese hip-hop came to be defined by the term 嘻哈
(xiha), the groups of the 1990s and 2000s used the expression 说 唱
(shuochang). Literally translated as “speaking-singing,” shuochang’s roots
lay in an ancient form of sung storytelling, before the practice was co-opted
by communist propaganda after the Revolution. (7) The influence of the
shuochang tradition was clearly visible in the first Beijing rap groups, who
used traditional instruments such as the erhu in their compositions, as well
as a Beijing dialect that closely resembled sung storytelling and the practice
of xiangsheng (相声), a sub-genre of shuochang that typically consists of a
comic dialogue between two people. (8) Although rap groups were not es-
pecially common in the early 2000s, hip-hop became integrated with other
styles of music that were popular in the Chinese alternative scene of that
time. In 2001, Scream Records released the debut album of Twisted Machine
(Niuqu de jiqi 扭曲的机器), who played a hybrid form of metal and hip-hop
known as nu-metal. Even Chinese rock icon Cui Jian (崔健) introduced rap
numbers into his albums, such as the song “Blue Bone” (Lanse gutou 蓝色
骨头) on the album Show Your Colour (Gei ni yidian yanse 给你一点颜色),
released in 2005. Meanwhile, punk-rock group Brain Failure (Nao zhuo 脑
浊) recruited legendary rapper Chuck D from the American group Public
Enemy for the song “A Box in the Broken Ball” on their 2009 album Down-
town Production (Jinxian erhuan yinei 仅限二环以内), as well as MC Yan
from Hong Kong’s LMF on “Ideal of Shinjuku” (Lixiang de Xinjiekou 理想的
新街口). Even pop music borrowed from hip-hop on certain songs, with
N o . 2 0 1 8 / 1 - 2  •  c h i n a  p e r s p e c t i v e s 107
1. “你有freestyle吗?”
2. “China’s Fledgling Hip-Hop Culture Faces Official Crackdown,” BBC News, 24 January 2018,
http://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-china-blog-42800032 (accessed on 21 February 2018).
3. “En Chine, l’avenir incertain du hip-hop” (Hip-hop’s uncertain future in China), L’Express, 22 Jan-
uary 2018, https://www.lexpress.fr/culture/musique/en-chine-l-avenir-incertain-du-hip-hop_
1978238.html (accessed on 21 February 2018).
4. Casey Quackenbush and Aria Hangyu Chen, “‘Tasteless, Vulgar and Obscene.’ China Just Banned
Hip-Hop Culture and Tattoos From Television,” Time, 22 January 2018, http://time.com/5112061/
china-hip-hop-ban-tattoos-television/ (accessed on 21 February 2018).
5. “Dispirited culture” was singled out on 17 August 2017 by the People’s Daily. See Zeng Yuli, “Turn
Off, Drop Out: Why Young Chinese Are Abandoning Ambition,” Sixth Tone, 27 June 2017,
http://www.sixthtone.com/news/1000407/turn-off%2C-drop-out-why-young-chinese-are-aban-
doning-ambition (accessed on 21 February 2018).
6. “总局提出节目嘉宾标准:格调低纹身嘻哈文化不用”(Zongju tichu jiemu jiabin biaozhun: ge
tiaodi wenshen xiha wenhua buyong, The central office announces behavioural standards for
guests: no more hip-hop or tattoos), 新 浪 娱 乐 (Sinlang Yule, Sina), 19 January 2018,
http://ent.sina.com.cn/tv/zy/2018-01-19/doc-ifyquptv7935320.shtml (accessed on 21 February
2018).
7. Tom Ireland, “Hip-Hop’s Ancient Predecessor: Shuochang,” The World of Chinese, 7 December
2011, http://www.theworldofchinese.com/2011/07/hip-hops-ancient-predecessor-shuochang/
(accessed on 21 February 2018).
8. This is demonstrated in Yin T’sang’s song “In Beijing” (Zai Beijing 在北京), one of Chinese rap’s
earliest hits. https://youtu.be/Qh6lJWfYyTo (accessed on 21 February 2018).
China pe rspect i vesCurrent affairs
“Do you Freestyle?”(1)
The Roots of Censorship in Chinese Hip-hop
NATHANEL  AMAR
Hong Kong Cantopop and Taiwanese Mandapop stars such as Edison Chen
and Jay Chou going so far as to describe themselves as rappers. One issue
of the music magazine published by the Modern Sky record label (Modeng
Tiankong 摩登天空) was dedicated to Chinese rap, and featured a long in-
terview with Edison Chen alongside more established rappers like MC Web-
ber. (9)
Meanwhile, hip-hop culture also developed in the form of rap “battles”
that were held during the early 2000s in a number of “underground” bars
in Shanghai and Beijing. American rapper MC Showtyme, who came to
Shanghai in the late 1990s, organised the first battles in 2001, initially in
Shanghai and then in Beijing. Backed by a predetermined beat, two rappers
are given an allotted time to confront each other, taking turns to improvise
“freestyle” lyrics while the audience decides which rapper is the winner. (10)
The “Iron Mic” contests (Gangtie maike 钢铁麦克) soon became popular—
especially following the success of 8 Mile, an American film released in 2003
starring rapper Eminem—and spawned a new generation of rappers such
as Beijing’s MC Dawei (MC大卫), Urumqi’s MC Majun (MC马俊), and In3
(Yin san’er 阴三儿) and Nasty Ray, both hailing from the Chinese capital.
Stepping away from the usual clichés propounded by hip-hop, these groups
addressed social topics and rapped about their frustration with authority,
be it official, parental, or educational. In3’s abrasive lyrics expressed the dis-
satisfaction of many young Chinese city-dwellers—for example in the song
“Good Morning, Teacher” (Laoshi nihao 老师你好), a scathing critique of
the academic institution taken from their self-produced 2008 album Un-
known Artist (Weizhi yishujia 未知艺术家) that epitomised this new gener-
ation of rappers:
没收我的东西我他妈都不要了
Those things you confiscated from me, I don’t fucking need them
跟别的都没事. 我跟你只有仇恨
It’s nothing to do with the others. I only feel hate for you
你扔了我的书包这事儿我永远记得
You threw away my book bag, I’ll never forget that
对你有偏见是因为我没换过座位
And if I’m prejudiced against you it’s because I never changed seats
一年四季挨着垃圾桶说话能不脏么
All year long, sat next to the trash can, it’s no wonder I’m vulgar
黑板上的裂缝就是我砸得
The crack in the blackboard, it was me who did that
你喝的每口水里他妈都有我的吐沫
And every time you sip your cup you drink my fucking saliva
In3 would pay dearly for embodying the rebellious spirit of Chinese rap.
On 10 August 2015, People’s Daily announced that the Chinese Ministry of
Culture had put 120 songs onto a blacklist (hei mingdan 黑名单). These 120
songs were withdrawn from all musical distribution platforms, and the
artists involved were banned from performing in public. (11) The Ministry jus-
tified this censorship by claiming that the songs promoted “obscenity, vio-
lence, and crime, and jeopardised morality.” (12) Rap groups figured heavily
on the blacklist: of all the songs listed, In3 ranked in first place with 17 cen-
sored songs—“Good Morning, Teacher” came in first place, followed by the
song “Beijing Evening News” (Beijing Wanbao 北京晚报), doubtless for its
controversial line, “Some people sleep in underpasses, while others eat out
on government expenses” (youren shui dixia tongdao, youren gongkuan
chihe guojia ji baoxiao, 有人睡地下通道, 有人公款吃喝国家给报销). The list
also includes Beijing hip-hop group Xinjiekou Crew (Xinjiekou zuhe 新街口
组合) as well as a large number of Taiwanese rappers such as Chang Csun,
Stanley Huang, and especially MC Hotdog for his song “Fuck Your Mother”
(Cao ni ma ge bi 操你妈个逼). In the 1990s, Geremie Barmé had already
noted that censorship of cultural products had the knock-on effect of fu-
elling a certain appetite abroad for what he termed “bankable dissent”
(Barmé 1999: 188). The 2015 blacklist produced the same effect, but within
China itself: a large number of Chinese web users downloaded the songs by
In3 that featured on the list, proceeding sarcastically to thank the censorship
department for introducing them to underground rap. (13) In September
2015, the members of In3 were arrested by Beijing police after returning
from a concert that had been held in Kunming. They were detained and re-
leased five days later, with no charges made against them. (14) According to
the foreign press, the arrests of rappers and censorship of certain hip-hop
groups was evidence that Xi Jinping had regained control of the Chinese
cultural sphere in 2015, following a relatively lax period up until 2012 under
the leadership of Hu Jintao. Indeed, after coming to power, Xi Jinping ordered
intellectuals and artists to communicate the “positive energy” of socialist
values, (15) while rap appears to contradict these “values” at every turn, given
its propensity for vulgarity and tackling social issues. The Party’s focus on
hip-hop, and not on punk, for example, is most likely due to its growing
popularity among Chinese youth.
The growing popularity and exposure of 
hip-hop and Sichuanese “trap” music
After underground hip-hop emerged in the 2000s, chiefly in Beijing and
Shanghai, a new form of Chinese rap, younger and more suited to social
media, found itself thrust into the limelight. By some margin, the best-
known hip-hop movement is now Sichuanese “trap,” a sub-genre that cel-
ebrates the region’s unique pronunciation and is promoted by music videos
with comparatively high production values. (16) Trap is a genre that stems
from rap, and was born in the southern states of America in the early 2000s.
It is distinguished by a slower rhythm and lyrics that discuss drug dealing
(the term comes from “trap houses,” houses used by dealers to produce and
distribute drugs). One well-known Sichuanese trap group is the Higher
Brothers (Hai’er xiongdi 海尔兄弟) from Chengdu, their moniker an opiated
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pun on the Chinese electrical appliance brand Haier. Active within the
Sichuanese hip-hop scene since the early 2010s, Higher Brothers have suc-
cessfully exported their sound far beyond the confines of Chinese rap, col-
laborating with foreign artists such as Korea’s Keith Ape on the song
“WeChat” (Weixin 微信) and with American rapper Ski Mask The Slump God
on the song “Flo Rida.” Ingenious videos such as “WeChat” (17) and “Made in
China” (18) have allowed Higher Brothers to build a reputation outside China
and, in February 2018, to travel to the United States for a sold-out tour en-
titled “Journey to the West,” while numerous press articles have reported on
their international popularity. (19) Higher Brothers’ songs, performed partly in
Mandarin and partly in Sichuanese, humorously describe the vagaries of daily
life for young people in China, naturally via the WeChat app, but also the il-
legal taxis (heiche 黑车) of Chengdu in “Black Cab,” (20) the 7-Eleven chain of
convenience stores in “7-11,” (21) and China’s industrial hegemony in “Made
in China.” According to some journalists, the fact that Higher Brothers have
not (yet) been censored proves that their songs are inoffensive, and on the
contrary may even be contributing to China’s cultural expansion around the
globe. (22) Such criticism does not appear to take into account the under-
ground organisational work that Higher Brothers have carried out within the
Sichuanese rap scene, especially as part of the CDC collective (Chengdu Rap
House, Shuochang huiguan 说唱会馆) that they helped to create.
GAI (whose real name is Zhou Yan 周延), a rapper from Chongqing, has
also gained notoriety through a series of trap videos where he appears naked
from the waist up, displaying his numerous tattoos in the classic interna-
tional tradition of “gangsta” rap. In 2015 he released his song “Gangsta”
(Chao shehui 超社会), where he describes his involvement with the local
mafia, surrounding himself with other bare-chested friends who wave knives
at the camera. 
哎呀 前段时间拿菜刀剥了个人
Not long ago I took a knife to stab a guy
喊我赔医药费 
He told me to pay his medical bills
我说我认帐
I said, sure, I’ll do it
但是老子不给 老子不给
But I don’t give a shit, I don’t give a shit
In interviews, GAI acknowledges that he writes songs based on his own
experience: 
Everything I talk about has really happened. At 13 I got into a brawl, I
was an outcast from society. (23)
But he links his involvement with the Chinese mafia to greater problems
in Chinese society as a whole: 
The gap between rich and poor in China is getting wider and wider. In
this society there are people who have nothing to eat. That’s why gang-
sters exist. (24)
Like many other representatives of Chinese rap, GAI has taken China’s “se-
cret societies” (hei shehui 黑 社 会 ) as a template for creating Chinese
gangsta rap, thereby brushing aside criticism that Chinese rap is merely a
pale imitation of American hip-hop. (25) The affiliation with “secret societies”
is clearly stated, particularly in GAI’s song “The Flow of Jiang-Hu” (Jianghu
liu 江湖流), performed in collaboration with Changsha rapper C-Block. (26)
In recent years another Chengdu rapper, Fat Shady (Xie Di 谢帝), has ac-
quired a certain notoriety. Speaking in a Sichuanese dialect, Fat Shady had
his moment of glory in 2014, when he took part in the popular TV talent
show “Sing My Song” (Zhongguo hao gequ 中国好歌曲 ), broadcast on
CCTV-3, by performing his best known song, “I’m Not Working Tomorrow”
(Mingtian bu shangban 明天不上班). (27) Fat Shady was one of the first rap-
pers to appear on a mainstream television show, helping to take hip-hop to
a wider audience. He also became well known to a broader Western audi-
ence with his song “Stupid Foreigner” (Gua laowai 瓜老外), which attacks
the arrogance of expatriates in China. A few foreign media outlets with bases
in China wasted no time in accusing Fat Shady of racism, (28) while some
members of the Chinese public were only too happy that a rapper had fi-
nally taken aim at the privileges of certain expatriates in China.
外国的朋友来中国
Our foreign friends who come to China
都晓得我们有票儿
They all know we’ve got money
都晓得我们有妹儿
They all know we’ve got girls
外国的朋友啥子人都有
Foreigners of all types
为赚钱啥子都会一点儿
They’ll do anything for money
长得高的都是模特儿
The tall ones become models 
今天是英语老师耶
Today you’re an English teacher
明天是年轻的企业家耶
Tomorrow, a young entrepreneur
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后天又变成了啥子?
What you gonna be, the day after that?
你想去装过来给老子擦车?
You want to come and wash my car?
Fat Shady’s 2014 appearance on “Sing My Song” may have helped to in-
troduce rap to a wider audience, but Chinese television created the first
programme to be entirely dedicated to the genre when Chinese online video
company iQiyi broadcast the first season of “The Rap of China” (Zhongguo
you xiha 中国有嘻哈) in June 2017. The show was produced by Taiwanese
singers Will Pan and Cheng Chenyue, Sino-Canadian pop star Kris Wu, and
Taiwanese rapper MC Hotdog. Two years previously, MC Hotdog had been
included on the Ministry of Culture’s blacklist, a clear demonstration of the
contradictory ways in which censorship is applied, taking aim at an ever-
changing range of targets according to circumstance. “The Rap of China”
was an immense success with the public, racking up more than 1.3 billion
views in the course of its first season, which awarded joint first place to GAI
and PG One, the latter being a rapper from Harbin and member of the HHH
(Hua Hong Hui 红花会) Collective. (29) However, web users lambasted the
show, ridiculing the pop star Kris Wu, who acted as one of the judges on the
TV talent show. They called his rap prowess into question, mocking his habit
of asking contestants whether they could “freestyle” (Ni you freestyle
ma? 你有freestyle吗 ?) via a series of memes shared on Chinese social
media. (30) The media in China and the West saw the show’s success as proof
that the hitherto underground musical genre had finally emerged as a pop-
ular phenomenon.
This was a golden age for Chinese rap, especially since the Communist
Party seemed to have accepted the culture and planned on using it for its
own propagandist ends. The songs of Chengdu rap group CD Rev (Tianfu
shibian 天府事变) were used to promote approved Party values, tinged with
overtones of nationalism. Their English-language song “The Force of Red”
sets out the group’s nationalist agenda: 
Fuck DPP [the Taiwanese Democratic Party], Fuck Tsai-Ing Wen [Pres-
ident of Taiwan], Y’all bitches ready for this shit? Taiwan ain’t a coun-
try! Bitch, at most a county, Please don’t even think about it (…).
There’s only one China, HK, Taipei, They are my fellas.
Although the members of CD Rev are not members of the Communist
Party, their videos are produced and directed by the Communist Youth
League’s in-house production team. Many foreign media outlets have re-
ported on the subject, seeing CD Rev as a perfect example of political co-
opting, omitting to mention the many criticisms levelled by Chinese rappers
at CD Rev, whom they consider mediocre, and who do not take part in “The
Rap of China.” (31)
PG One and GAI: The birth of a scandal
Hip-hop’s growing popularity within China’s youth culture could not go
unnoticed. Just as Chinese rock music, extremely popular in the 1980s, be-
came marginalised by censorship after 1989, the Communist Party author-
ities took the sudden and unexpected decision in January 2018 to prohibit
television stations from featuring any representatives of hip-hop culture in
their shows. This decision was implemented after an intensive propaganda
campaign led by the Communist Youth League in early January 2018. On 4
January at 3:26 p.m., the Youth League posted a message on the Weibo so-
cial network accusing PG One, also known as Wang Hao (王昊) and co-win-
ner of “The Rap of China,” of encouraging young people to take drugs and
humiliate women in one of his early songs, “Christmas Eve” (Shengdan ye 圣
诞夜), also stating that “public figures on the Internet should act as positive
role models and set a good example to our country’s adolescents.” (32) The
Communist Youth League’s statement was apparently made following on-
line complaints about PG One, an increasingly popular means of calling out
artists, either because they fail to respect the values approved by the au-
thorities, or through simple opportunism. (33) PG One had already been the
subject of online rumours in December accusing him of having an extra-
marital relationship with an actress. (34) The Youth League’s accusation, which
was shared more than 20,000 times and received more than 55,000 com-
ments, was accompanied by a screen-grab of the song concerned, which
makes reference to “the pure stuff” (Chunbaise de fenmo 纯白色的粉末, lit-
erally “pure white powder,” or what Booba would call “0.9”):
纯白色的粉末在板上走 
The pure stuff is spread out on the floor 
和homie roll起 怕的都去休息 
I’m rolling with my homies, I’m worried they’re all going to fall asleep
跟我们一起来到酒吧前 
Before we all hit the bar together
我的homie还没有发言 
My homies ain’t said nothing yet
一个不要脸的bitch开始手发闲 
A brazen bitch gives me manual pleasure
结果告诉我她九八年 
She tells me she was born in ‘98
想让我办了她 
She wants me to go to work on her
她装作自己已抽醉 
She pretends she’s already wasted, out of her head
还是算了吧算了吧站在那看着她 
But it ain’t worth it, ain’t worth it, I’ll just stay here and watch her
她却说你所有的歌我全都会
She tells me she knows all my songs
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因为想法从不封建 
Because I ain’t some feudal lord
今天可以到我家里一边看雪一边party 
Today we can go to my place, take some powder and have some fun
眼睛里只有Versace变成我手里的芭比 
They only have eyes for Versace, when they’re with me they all turn into
Barbie
嘴里塞满money 眼神麻痹坐上玛莎拉蒂
With their mouths full of money, bug-eyed, they climb in my Maserati
Bitch都来我的家里住 
Bitches, you should all come live with me
全部撅起屁股cos圣诞小麋鹿 
Show me your booty, dressed up like a reindeer
就骑在她肩上把燃料抽精光唱铃儿响叮当 
I climb on top of them and drain my tank, while singing Jingle Bells
The same day at 4:11 p.m., less than an hour after the Youth League’s
accusation was made, PG One posted a statement in which he expressed
regret for his actions. (35) In the statement, which was shared more than
180,000 times and received nearly 900,000 comments, PG One apolo-
gised for the lyrics of the song that he released early in his career, and re-
assured the public that “having become more mature, I will promote a
sense of social responsibility and become a better role model to my fans.”
But it was his explanation of how he discovered hip-hop that provoked
controversy, when he claimed that his misplaced understanding of rap
stemmed from “the deep-rooted influence of black music” (heiren yinyue
黑人音乐). This excuse, which cast hip-hop in a racialised and culturalist
light, drew numerous criticisms from Chinese web users, but was never-
theless echoed by the official press. The PG One “scandal,” opportunely
exploited by the Communist Youth League, had the immediate effect of
getting all of PG One’s songs removed from every platform in China. But
the following week, the official censors also came down heavily on GAI,
the other winner of “The Rap of China”: His appearance on the show “I
Am a Singer” (Wo shi geshou 我是歌手), a highly popular reality show on
Hunan TV, was cancelled, while the footage of his appearance on the first
episode, on January 12th, was removed from all online video sites. (36)
However, GAI had given the Chinese authorities a guarantee of good be-
haviour the previous December in an appearance on the CCTV-3 show “I
Want to Go to the Spring Gala” (Wo yao shang chunwan 我要上春晚),
where he sang “Long Live Our Motherland” (Zhuguo wansui 祖国万岁) for
the audience. This clearly shows how indiscriminately censorship is ap-
plied, but also reveals its inconsistencies—such as the banning of MC
Hotdog from Chinese airwaves in 2015, followed by his reappearance on
a TV programme in 2017. 
Official outrage on social media to the
censorship of “hip-hop culture”
But it was the scale and speed at which hip-hop was censored that was
unexpected. As previously mentioned, on 19 January 2018, a Sina press dis-
patch reported that the SAPPRFT had sent an advisory notice to Chinese
TV stations stating that they should no longer allow representatives of hip-
hop culture or tattooed persons to appear (37) in the wake of the PG One
scandal. The fact that this decree included tattoos should come as no sur-
prise, as tattoos feature prominently in hip-hop culture, and rappers, be they
from China or anywhere else, proudly wear their allegiance to the subculture
on their bodies. The Chinese authorities’ attitude toward the practice of tat-
tooing is a long and complex one: indeed, until 2011 it was impossible for
anyone with tattoos to join the Chinese army. (38) Traditionally, tattoos were
considered a mark of shame, forbidden by Confucianism, which considered
them an affront to filial piety (Reed 2000), but they were also associated
with the “barbarians” who were not part of the Han elite (Lei 2009) and
“secret societies” (hei shehui 黑社会) involved in the jianghu space (Boretz
2011). The SAPPRFT’s directive therefore grouped together a variety of dif-
ferent practices that appeared to have a negative influence on Chinese
youth. But if we look more closely at the various opinions that were ex-
pressed in the Chinese media before the SAPPRFT made its recommenda-
tions, it is possible to discern a number of standpoints, not all of which
favour such a blunt form of censorship. Global Times, an English-language
nationalist paper, followed at length the developments in Chinese hip-hop,
both before and after the PG One scandal. 
Before any scandal had been provoked by PG One’s lyrics, Global Times
had reported on the recent surge in hip-hop’s popularity, covering the rapper
Sun Bayi (孙八一), who took part in “The Rap of China,” and the Higher
Brothers. (39) On 4 January 2018, Global Times reported on the controversy
between the Communist Youth League and PG One, accusing the rapper of
setting a poor example for Chinese youth. (40) On 8 January 2018, ten days
after the SAPPRFT is alleged to have sent out its directives on hip-hop,
Global Times published two comparatively divergent opinions on the mat-
ter. The first, taking a somewhat Maoist tone, told rappers to “repent” and
“purify” their songs. (41) In the article, Global Times castigated PG One, while
celebrating the notion of “rap with Chinese qualities,” citing the group CD
Rev as a good example (while neglecting to mention the tone of their sexist
attack on Tsai Ing-wen—vulgarity apparently being permissible when aimed
at enemies of the Party) as well as Sun Bayi, who in the wake of the con-
troversy released a song quoting extracts from the 19th National Congress
of the Chinese Communist Party. The second opinion piece published that
day was far less nuanced, and questioned whether a Chinese style of hip-
hop could even exist. (42) This latter article claimed that since rap was born
in the United States within the African-American community, it could not
be applied to the situation in China, where racism and social discrimination
did not occur, and in addition, that China had no comparable phenomenon
to “gangsta” culture. This culturalist attitude to rap subculture, which also
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displayed a profound ignorance of Chinese society, would in future serve
as the pretext for the ban on hip-hop in China. While the first article ex-
plored the possibility of a uniquely Chinese style of rap music, taking CD
Rev and Sun Bayi as its template, the second denied that hip-hop had
any relevance on Chinese soil. On 9 January 2018, another article, which
once again reported on the growing popularity of rap, (43) attempted to
reconcile these two viewpoints, stating that “even though hip-hop is a
product of African-American culture, that doesn’t mean it can’t talk about
people’s experiences in China,” simultaneously reprimanding PG One and
GAI, while praising Duo Li Gang (多力岗) and Su Han (宿涵), who posted
online a song produced by Tsinghua University entitled “Tsinghua Tao”
(Shui mu dao 水木道). (44) On 18 January 2018, Global Times announced
that GAI would not be taking part in the next episode of the talent show
“I Am a Singer,” (45) and this was confirmed on 21 January by another ar-
ticle announcing broader censorship of hip-hop in the Chinese media,
adding that female rapper VaVa, another contestant on “The Rap of
China,” had been hastily cut from the edit of a show called “Happy
Camp” (Kuaile dabenying 快乐大本营), broadcast on Hunan TV. (46) Al-
though we regrettably cannot know the decision-making process that
led to hip-hop’s disappearance from the Chinese airwaves after 19 Jan-
uary 2018, an analysis of the viewpoints put forth by the Chinese official
press prior to the SAPPRFT’s alleged directives would appear to suggest
that a range of opinions coexisted among the official authorities, espe-
cially regarding certain officially sanctioned rap groups—CD Rev, pro-
duced by the Communist Youth League, or Sun Bayi—but the growing
popularity of “deviant” groups, coupled with the vast quantities of criti-
cism and mockery from web users aimed at “red” rappers, must have
caught the authorities off-guard, leading them to adopt more drastic,
unilateral measures.
After the removal in January of rappers from Chinese public television,
China’s internet has also witnessed new forms of censorship, the most re-
cent of which affects the country’s most popular live-streaming sites. In
fastidious obedience to the SAPPRFT’s alleged directives, the site YY.com
has banned the live broadcasting of rap in any form, but also of any tat-
tooed individuals, in order to comply with its new site regulations, pub-
lished on 26 January 2018. (47) The latest victim goes by the name “hanmai”
(喊麦), which translates as “screaming into the microphone,” a hip-hop
sub-genre that developed in north-west China, where a web user sings live
over a basic beat. Seventy-seven songs were removed from the site, and
some web users, such as the hanmai star MC Tianyou (MC 天佑), were
forced to change their names, since the term “MC” (Master of Ceremony)
was reserved exclusively for rappers. (48) Even though hanmai is a much-
derided genre within the Chinese hip-hop world, widely considered to be
a “low quality” rural variant of rap, online video sharing platforms never-
theless took swift action, banning a musical style that could be considered
similar to hip-hop and thereby avoiding any potential intervention by the
official censorship authorities.
Conclusion
By all accounts, Chinese hip-hop appears to be on a trajectory towards
popular recognition, but also towards co-opting by the Chinese authori-
ties. From its underground beginnings, hip-hop developed on the margins
of Chinese society throughout the 1990s and 2000s before gaining noto-
riety thanks to the participation of certain rappers in popular TV talent
shows. The most controversial rappers—such as GAI—also began to give
guarantees of good behaviour to the authorities, while certain rap
groups—heavily criticised by their peers—were only too happy to adopt
a stance in line with that of the Party. The effect of censorship has been
to bring hip-hop back into the Chinese cultural conversation, and also to
demonstrate that no style of music, however popular, is exempt from toe-
ing the Party line. Moreover, targeting hip-hop at a time when its popu-
larity is expanding prompts other cultural producers to bear in mind Xi
Jinping’s directive that the cultural industries should communicate “pos-
itive energy.” (49) Further afield, since hip-hop culture is in many respects
inherently subversive, it has also caused controversy in other political con-
texts: for example, in France in 1997, when rappers from the group NTM
were given a two-month suspended prison sentence for targeting the po-
lice with aggressive remarks (Laroche 2016), or in February 2018, when
rapper Sofiane was given a four-month suspended sentence for shooting
a music video that blocked traffic on a highway. (50) Scandals like these
provide us with a different perspective on subcultures in China, as well as
helping us to reassess the notion of applying “Chinese qualities” to im-
ported cultural forms, as suggested by the articles in Global Times. Accu-
sations of “co-opting” or “cultural appropriation” are nothing new, since
identical charges were levelled at hip-hop in Japan in the 1990s, as Ian
Condry reminds us. (51) Since then, hip-hop has established a durable pres-
ence in Japan, where it is now one of the most popular forms of music,
following a long time in the underground where it acquired a subversive
reputation. Nevertheless, the pre-eminence of the Chinese Communist
Party seems to have slowed hip-hop’s rise to mass popularity—though
for how long?—and hip-hop has been forced to return to its underground
roots in order to survive. Even so, GAI’s recent unexpected return through
the release of his new music video “Endless Flow” (Changhe 长河), (52) to
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promote the Chongqing liquor Jiang Xiaobai (江小白), tends to show that
Chinese rappers have not yet said their last word. (53)
z Translated by David Buchanan.
z Nathanel Amar is a postdoctoral fellow at the Society of Fellows in
the Humanities at the University of Hong Kong (namar@hku.hk).
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